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ABSTRACT
Since the widespread adoption of the internet, computer security has become
one of the primary concerns of computer systems engineers, who are often
faced with a choice between increased performance and stronger security
policies. Many advancements in computer security impose a performance
penalty. One such advancement, control-flow integrity (CFI), offers immunity
to code-reuse attacks but slows down software that enforces CFI. In this
work, we present a hardware monitor design that utilizes hardware support
for instruction tracing to detect code-reuse attacks. The monitor is small in
hardware size, uses low power, and does not decrease software performance.
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Malware is often constructed from techniques to subvert machine-code ex-
ecution through reuse of existing program code. In order to bypass data
execution prevention (DEP), an exploit typically employs return-oriented or
jump-oriented programming. These are known as code-reuse attacks (CRA).
One way to protect a program from CRAs is to enforce the safety property
control-flow integrity (CFI). CFI enforces that the execution of a program
cannot deviate from its control-flow graph (CFG). In this work, we present
a CFI policy and hardware design to enforce the policy.
CFI [1] is a defense mechanism that aims to prevent CRAs and all other
control-flow hijacking attacks under an attack model where the attacker can
read and write any process memory (but not instructions). CFI ensures that
the execution of a program follows a path in the CFG. Any control flow
transfer that is not described by an edge in the CFG is a CFI violation that
terminates the program. Any invalid control flow caused by an attacker will
be detected, without regard to the exploit mechanism that caused the invalid
target of the transfer.
In this work, we assume the standard attack model for CFI. The operating
system and hardware are secure and fault-free. The attacker can change
arbitrary data in memory on the stack, heap and global variables of the
protected program. Data memory is not executable, and instruction memory
is not writable (W⊕X policy). Therefore, the attacker cannot cause the
program to execute instructions that the attacker places in memory.
Return-oriented programming (ROP) [2] is a method used by attackers
to create new behavior in a program by changing the target of subroutine
returns. In ROP, the attacker finds short sequences of instructions in memory
that end with return, or another type of indirect control transfer instruction
[3]. Several sequences are chained together to achieve arbitrary computation.
A perfect CFI policy defeats ROP but it can be desirable to implement a
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relaxed CFI policy for improved system performance. A relaxed CFI policy
must be careful to ensure that practical exploits cannot be constructed using
ROP.
Research on CFI can be broadly categorized as either software enforced
or hardware enforced. Software enforcement requires the insertion of new
instructions into a program before at the indirect branch instructions and
the target sites. Given the source code to a program, this can be done in the
compiler. Lacking source code to a program, an approximate CFG may be
derived that allows insertion of some CFI checks through binary rewriting.
Hardware techniques [4] typically require compiler generated code or binary
program rewriting, but they differ from software techniques in that they
generally include CFI-specific instructions in the instruction set architecture
(ISA). Hardware enforcement allows very low performance overhead, but may
require modifications to the processor and the binary program.
The design presented here, Hardware Signature Monitor (HSMON), does
not use binary rewriting or code insertion by the compiler. It has low per-
formance overhead, and does not require changes to the processor core or
the instruction set. We achieve this using two developments—a CFG path
signature technique for enforcing a relaxed CFI and a hardware instruction
trace monitor.
Signature modeling [5, 6] is a method used to detect control flow violations
for the purpose of fault detection. Each executing instruction updates a
signature that is periodically checked against a set of reference values. If there
is no corresponding reference value there is a fault. Because we assume error-
free hardware, the only control flow violations possible are due to indirect
branches. HSMON computes signatures based on only the indirect branch
target addresses. An indirect control path signature is a generated from a
short sequence of previous indirect control transfer targets. Valid signatures
are derived from the CFG and loaded into the hardware just prior to the
start of the program. Control flow attacks, including ROP, generate run-
time signatures that are not part of the valid set of signatures for a program,
so HSMON identifies the control flow violation. The details of signature
generation are in Section 3.3.
Modern CPUs generate instruction traces for the purpose of in-system de-
bugging. HSMON uses hardware support for instruction trace to observe
control flow paths with a hardware unit that operates asynchronously to the
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central processing unit (CPU) core. Instruction traces convey information
about the state of a CPU core and the instructions being executed. Example
trace data includes branch outcomes, branch targets, exceptions, traps, and
cycle counts. Trace data is captured to main memory or output directly to a
dedicated trace port. Efficient trace protocols encode only information that
cannot be obtained through static code analysis. Variable length trace pack-
ets and stateful protocols are used to further reduce bandwidth requirements.
Instruction trace monitoring used by HSMON is described in Section 3.2.
Obtaining the CFG by static analysis of a large binary program remains
a challenge for current research. Target inference of indirect control-flow
(ICF) transfers are particularly challenging because unrestricted ICF allows
transfer to any target address. One approach, bin-CFI [7], provides a 99%
reduction in possible ICF targets. Although HSMON requires static analysis
of ICF targets, our research does not address the problem of sophisticated
static analysis of ICF targets. Future improvements in this area will enhance
the effectiveness of the path signature method used here.
This work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes related work. Chap-
ter 3 details the system architecture of the hardware, software and discusses
key concepts. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the hardware
architecture and the microarchitecture of each component. Chapter 5 eval-
uates the results of the implementation of a prototype system. Chapter 6




In this chapter, we first describe a brief history of CRAs and W⊕X. Next,
we discuss related work on hardware monitoring IP using instruction traces
to detect CRAs.
Traditional stack-smashing attacks consist of injecting executable code,
called shellcode, into a program’s memory then redirecting the programs
control flow to the shellcode. Most commonly, it is the return address that is
overwritten by the attacker. W⊕X stops the attacker from writing shellcode
into memory. Another method of attack is known as return-to-libc [8]. An
attacker uses a library subroutine, typically in the C library, instead of shell-
code. The return address is overwritten by the attacker with the address of
the library subroutine. This type of attack is not prevented by W⊕X because
it does not require injection of shellcode into writable memory. Despite this
limitation, W⊕X makes it more difficult for the attacker to exploit vulnerable
programs, so it is used widely in commercial operating systems.
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is a generalization of the return-to-
libc attack [2, 3]. This technique uses short sequences of instructions, called
gadgets, to create new behavior using fragments of the original program code.
Each gadget is a short sequence of instructions, in the program, that ends
with a return instruction. The attacker writes a sequence of gadget addresses
on the stack, so the CPU will execute each gadget in the sequence determined
by the attacker. A variation of this is called jump-oriented programming
(JOP) [9]. In this case, the attacker finds gadgets that end in a jump (indirect
branch) instruction and a special dispatcher gadget. The sequence of gadget
addresses is written into memory that the dispatcher gadget reads as a table
of addresses where the program should jump. JOP does not need the stack
or return instructions, and can be constructed from jump instructions using
any CPU register.
To the best of our knowledge, Lee et al. [10] were the first to introduce a
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hardware CRA monitor that uses trace monitoring rather than CPU mod-
ifications. They implement CRA detection hardware for the 32-bit ARM
CoreSight program trace macrocell (PTM). A shadow call stack is used to
detect return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks. Meta-data gathered by
static program analysis is stored in main memory and accessed by the ROP
monitor. Performance overhead is reported to be 1 to 4 percent over the
baseline but the operating frequency of the host CPU is 200 MHz. Typical
configurations of the FPGA device used in that work operate the CPU at 1
GHz.
The next work from Lee et al. [11] uses a similar architecture to the
first, with binary program rewriting to replace the main memory meta-data.
Detection of jump-oriented programming (JOP) is introduced. Performance
overhead due to the CRA monitor is reported from 1 to 10 percent. The
operating frequency of the CPU is further reduced to 60 MHz in this work.
Neither [10, 11] provide sufficient justification for the slow CPU frequency.
Compared to the prior work, our approach uses neither binary rewriting
nor main memory. Avoiding both of those means that memory access pat-





In this chapter, we give an overview of the system, describe relevant archi-
tecture features, key concepts, and the operation of HSMON as it observes
the instruction trace of a program.
3.1 System-on-Chip Overview
The prototype system for our design is implemented using a Xilinx Zynq
Ultrascale+ EG (ZynqMP). ZynqMP is a heterogeneous system based on
a 64-bit ARM quad-core CPU with Xilinx 8-series field programmable gate
array (FPGA) on a single 16 nm integrated circuit system-on-chip (SoC) [12].
Four ARM Cortex-A53 cores are the primary component of the processing
system. The cores communicates with the programmable logic, or FPGA,
through a central interconnect that implements the AMBA AXI4 interface
protocol [13].
ZynqMP integrates the ARM CoreSight architecture [14] to provide real-
time debug and trace. The CoreSight architecture defines a standard set
of interfaces for debug and trace components so that software and hardware
from multiple vendors can be integrated on the same SoC. ZynqMP integrates
CoreSight component IP cores from ARM to implement the debug and trace
architecture [15, 16]. CoreSight components form the communication path
that connects HSMON to the ARM Cortex-A53 trace unit.
The ARM embedded trace macrocell (ETM) is a component of each CPU
core in the processing system of the ZynqMP. It gathers information from
the processor pipeline and encodes that in a format called the ETMv4 trace
protocol. Encoded instruction trace packets are placed on the ARM trace
bus (ATB) of the processing system. The programmable logic reads from the
ATB through the trace port interface unit (TPIU).
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HSMON is designed in the hardware description language SystemVerilog,
synthesized, placed, and routed in the programmable logic. It connects to
the central interconnect with an AXI4 slave port and receives trace data from











Figure 3.1: System architecture.
The ETM and the TPIU are built-in hardware modules of the processing
system. Both are activated by a driver program that accesses each devices
memory-mapped registers. In this system, we configure the ETM to emit
only instruction trace packets for user-mode programs. No trace information
for supervisor (or hypervisor) modes are sent to the TPIU. The TPIU is
configured to format the trace stream with trace source identifiers so multiple
copies of HSMON may be synthesized in the same programmable logic, one
for each CPU core. The trace decoder front end of HSMON is configured
through memory-mapped input/output IO) with the trace source identifier
of the CPU core that is to be monitored. Instruction trace packets are of
variable length. The trace decoder tags the byte that ends each packet with
an additional bit to indicate which byte ends a packet. From there, the
packets are sent to the signature checker. Further detail on the hardware
architecture of the trace decoder and signature checker are in Chapter 4.
3.2 Trace Monitoring
The ETMv4 [17] instruction trace protocol is designed to minimize trace
bandwidth. Conventional usage of the trace port for system debugging would
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connect a protocol analyzer to the trace port pins external to the integrated
circuit package. Due to the bandwidth constraints, the architects at ARM
chose to only emit trace information that cannot be inferred by static analy-
sis. Most importantly, direct branch instruction trace information is emitted
in a compressed form called atoms. Atom packets indicate only the branch
outcome, that is, branch taken or branch not taken. Straight through code,
when the program counter increments to the subsequent instruction, does
not emit any packets. Several encodings of address packets indicate an indi-
rect control flow transfer to a target that cannot be inferred through static
analysis. Instructions that emit address packets are listed in Table 3.1 [18].
Context packets indicate the hardware context ID, which is set to the pro-
cess ID by the Linux kernel during an OS context switch. A context packet
also indicates the processors exception level, virtual machine identifier, and
64-bit or 32-bit instruction mode.
Table 3.1: Frequently used address packet generating instructions.
Mnemonic Instruction
BLR Branch with link to register
BR Branch to register
RET Return from subroutine
BRK Breakpoint
HLT Halt
HVC Generate exception to hypervisor
SMC Generate exception to secure monitor
SVC Generate exception to operating system
ERET Exception return
Enforcing a strong CFI policy requires us to validate all indirect control
flow transfers. The trace protocol we have just discussed does not indicate
the source of an indirect control transfer—only the target. In order to know
the source and validate possible targets we would need to store the CFG in
a manner accessible to the trace monitor hardware so that it can follow the
CFG using the atom packets until an address packet is observed. At that
point the monitor would know the source of the transfer.
We avoid storing the complete CFG by analysis of only paths of indirect
control flow to determine the targets. This method allows us to use only in-
8
formation present in the trace protocol, with relatively little storage required
compared to storing the entire CFG.
3.3 Indirect Control Path Signatures
As discussed in the previous section, direct control flow transfers are only vis-
ible in the instruction trace as atom packets that indicate whether a branch
is taken or not taken. Indirect control transfers caused by RET, BR, and
BLR instructions encode the target address in the instruction trace. Excep-
tion, interrupts and system calls encode the target address and the exception
return address in the instruction trace at the time the exception, interrupt
or system call occurs.
In order to reduce the storage requirement of information gathered through
static analysis, we introduce indirect control path signatures. An indirect
control path signature is a hash computed from the target address of each
indirect control transfer instruction. We compare the computed signature
against each reference signature when HSMON detects a context switch
caused by the SVC instruction; when the monitor detects a system call.
Static analysis of the CFG derives the set of indirect control path signatures
by backwards traversal of the CFG along all paths leading to a basic block
containing a SVC instruction. Due to the presense of loops in most pro-
grams, all paths traversal of the CFG may never terminate and the set of
hashes may be of infinite size. To avoid this problem we fix the number of
indirect branch addresses that make up the signature to a small number.
Figure 3.2 shows a small program with several indirect branches that we
will use to understand how the signature is generated. In this example, we
limit the number of address hashes that make up a signature to N = 4.
In order to generate the set of signatures, we must start at the instruction
following each SVC instruction and traverse the CFG backwards to reach
either address hash limit N or the “ start” symbol. The instruction trace
emits the exception return address when a system call is taken, so we will use
that as the first address hash S1 = H(d) in the signature. Moving backward,
we see that block b is a return target because it follows a BLR instruction,
so the address hash becomes S1 = H(d) ⊕ H(b). Block (g) is the target




_start: adr x1, h
ldr x20, j
blr x20
a: adr x1, i
ldr x20, k
blr x20










h: .ascii "hello "









Figure 3.2: Example assembly language source code and CFG.
S1 = H(d) ⊕H(b) ⊕H(g). Finally, we reach block e, which terminates the
algorthim because it is the fourth address to get
S1 = H(d)⊕H(b)⊕H(g)⊕H(e)
The second system call returns to block g so we start with S2 = H(g),
then walk backward to get S2 = H(g) ⊕H(e). Block e is the target of two
indirect branch and link instructions. We will follow both forks to compute
two signatures, S2 and S3. Choosing block a we see that it is a return target
because it follows BLR, so we get S2 = H(g)⊕H(e)⊕H(a). As previously
shown, we include block g because it is the target of a system call return, so
the final signature is
S2 = H(g)⊕H(e)⊕H(a)⊕H(g)
The third signature is generated from where we forked S2 at call target e.
There we had S3 = H(g) ⊕ H(e). The global “ start” symbol is always
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an indirect target on our prototype platform, so we include it. The final
signature is
S3 = H(g)⊕H(e)⊕H( start)
Now that we understand how to generate a set of signatures through static
analysis let us explore how a signature is computed when a program runs on
the CPU core (forward CFG traversal). The set of signatures is repeated
below for your reference while reading Section 3.4.
S1 = H(d)⊕H(b)⊕H(g)⊕H(e)
S2 = H(g)⊕H(e)⊕H(a)⊕H(g)
S3 = H(g)⊕H(e)⊕H( start)
3.4 Run-Time Signature Monitoring
Generating the signature set is only necessary once for a given program bi-
nary. Either an external tool or the operating system can analyze the pro-
gram to derive the allowed signatures. We must also generate signatures
during execution of the program to check against the allowed signatures. We
will understand how this works by example using Figure 3.2 from Section
3.3. For this, we focus our attention on the assembly listing on the left side
of the figure.
We start with an initial run-time signature initialized to SR = 0. The
program begins with an indirect jump to the “ start” symbol so the sig-
nature becomes SR = H( start). It proceeds to the end of the block and
follows the indirect branch to instruction e, so we update the signature to
SR = H( start) ⊕ H(e). Now the program reaches the system call at f, so
we include the system call return address in the signature and it becomes
SR = H( start)⊕H(e)⊕H(g). Because the exclusive-or (XOR) operator is
commutative and associative, it is easy to show that SR = S3, so the run-time
signature is equal to the signature derived through static analysis.
The program continues after the system call return. The instruction g
returns to a so we update the signature to SR = H( start)⊕H(e)⊕H(g)⊕
H(a). The next indirect branch transfers control to e and we have reached
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the limit of N = 4 hashes in the signature. We remove the oldest hash and
add the new one, SR = H(e)⊕H(g)⊕H(a)⊕H(e). The system call is reached
so the signature is now SR = H(g)⊕H(a)⊕H(e)⊕H(g). Now SR = S2 so
we have a valid signature according to our previous static analysis.
After the system call returns, the instruction g returns to b and the sig-
nature becomes SR = H(a)⊕H(e)⊕H(g)⊕H(b). The next control transfer
occurs at c. Even though this system call cannot return, we include the sys-
tem call return d as we have with other system calls. The signature is now
SR = H(e) ⊕ H(g) ⊕ H(b) ⊕ H(d). Just like before, the signature matches
on the of the static analysis signatures. SR = S1.
As shown by the previous example, an important consideration is that the
operator used to compute the signature from the address hashes needs to
have the communitativity property and the associativity property. Because
we initialized the SR to 0, we also need the identity A ⊕ 0 = A for any A.
Another property of XOR is that each value is its own inverse. For each A,
A ⊕ A = 0. In the previous example, we did not need this property. It is
useful for efficient implementation of run-time signature monitoring for large
values of N . Instead of using XOR N − 1 times every time the signature
is checked, we use it exactly three times when the signature is updated.
Consider one of the updates in the prior example. The signature is SR =
H( start) ⊕ H(e) ⊕ H(g) ⊕ H(a) and the program transfers to e. Assume




S ′R = SR ⊕H(e)⊕H( start)
Other operations can be used if they have the same properties. We use
bitwise XOR because it can be computed with fast circuits in hardware for
any fixed bit width output hash function.
We define a violation in this system as a run-time signature that is not
found in the set of signatures derived through static analysis. In the code
example we have discussed so far it is possible for an attacker to cause a vio-
lation under our attack model. The data section of the program is controlled
by the attacker. Code pointers are stored at locations labeled j and k in data
memory.
No library code is used in the example shown in Figure 3.2. For this dis-
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cussion, let us assume a modified program that has additional executable
code in memory that is not reachable during normal (no-attack) code exe-
cution (dead code). Now suppose that an attacker alters code pointer k to
point to instructions in the dead code prior to the execution of block a. Any
SVC instruction in the dead code will cause a violation because the address
following the SVC instruction is part of the signature. The attacker must
reuse the existing system call instructions that are part of the normal code.
It is reasonable to assume that no dead code would have a direct control
transfer to any label other than e because it is the only subroutine in the
example. Let us consider the case where the attacker attempts to use the
system call at f by using a direct control transfer to e. The signature at the
system call is H(g) ⊕ H(a) ⊕ H(deadcode) ⊕ H(g). Now consider the case
where the attacker cause an indirect control transfer to e. The signature is
H(a)⊕H(deadcode)⊕H(e)⊕H(g).
A gadget could exist in the dead code that allows the attacker to cause
an indirect transfer to the same address deadcode a second time before an
indirect transfer to e. We must consider what happens in this case. The
signature on the first control transfer to deadcode is H(g)⊕H(a)⊕H(e)⊕
H(deadcode). The second control transfer updates it to H(a)⊕H(e) because
of the properties of XOR discussed previously. It is easy to see that neither an
indirect nor direct transfer to e will generate a valid signature, so a violation
will occur.
Now we understand the methods of generating signatures from static anal-
ysis and run-time instruction execution. We still need a method to store the
set of allowed signatures that facilitates fast access. In the next section we
describe how we store a large set of signatures, test set membership quickly,
and discuss the limitations of our approach.
3.5 Signature Storage
The final concept we explore before describing the operation of HSMON
is the the data structure and algorithm for storing the signatures that are
derived by the static analyis. We want this storage to be small in size,
offer low latency read access, high bandwidth write access for transferring
the signature set into the monitor device, and be simple to implement in
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hardware.
We use the Bloom filter [19] data structure to satisfy these requirements.
A Bloom filter is a probablistic data structure used to test if an element is
a member of as set. A Bloom filter allows errors in order to be more time
and space efficient than algorithms that test set membership without errors.
Only false positives are possible. A false positive indicates that an element
is a member of the set, when it is not. False negatives do not occur. In our
case, a false positive allows a signature that should be a violation.
We consider this to be an acceptable tradeoff for increased performance
of the real-time monitor. As long as the error rate low, it is difficult for
an attacker to find a code path that causes a false positive. The primary
impediment is that the attacker does not know the seed input to the hash
function H. The attacker has read access to all memory in the process under
our attack model but the signature set and the seed input to the hash function
is not part of the process memory. An attacker would not be able to compute
the set of signatures without the hash function seed values.
3.6 HSMON Operation
In this section we describe the operation of HSMON in a system running
the Linux operating system. HSMON continuously monitors the instruc-
tion trace received through the trace port. It operates in parallel and asyn-
chronous to the CPU core that it monitors. The hardware monitor runs
passively until enabled. Only two event counters operate when it is disabled.
One counts the number of 4-byte trace words received from the selected CPU
core. The other counts the number of 4-byte trace words that are lost (or
dropped) by the monitor.
Prior to being enabled, the monitor is programmed with the Context ID of
the program of interest. In Linux, the context ID is the same as the operating
system process ID. The monitor is also programmed with the start address
from which to being actively monitoring the trace stream. This is usually the
“ start” or “main” symbol of the program. It is also programmed with the
Bloom filter bits that encode the signature set. An additional Bloom filter
memory records a log of all signatures observed since the start address, but
the memory must be cleared manually before the program starts.
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Once programmed, the monitor must be enabled before the program begins
execution. The monitor ignores all events until the programmed start address
is observed in the trace stream. Beginning with this address, the indirect
control flow path signature is updated on every observed target address and
system call in user mode for the programmed context ID. Once a system call
is observed in the trace stream, the monitor checks the Bloom filter to know
if the computed signature is in the set. If it is not, the violation counter
increments and an interrupt is raised.
Each system call increments the system call counter. At the same time,
the bits generated from the signature that are checked against the Bloom
filter are recorded in the the log memory. In some cases, the log memory
may be used to build the set of signatures over time by repeatedly running
the program under different inputs. The log memory is in the same format
as the Bloom filter data so it can be saved and reloaded later.
Further details of the operation of the hardware monitor can be found in
Chapter 4, which describes the design of the hardware and software that
controls HSMON. Detailed programming information is described, and a




HSMON is a semiconductor intellectual property core (IP core) that is in-
tegrated into SoC designs that use ARM CoreSight components. HSMON
receives data from the TPIU component. It is configured by the operating
system software through an AXI4-Lite memory-mapped slave port. In this
chapter, we describe the design and operational details of each component of






















Figure 4.1: HSMON block diagram.
Figure 4.1 shows the main blocks of HSMON. HSMON is divided into
two clock domains, the slow clock domain and fast clock domain. The slow
clock domain contains the bus and trace port interface logic, as well as the
hash queue and Bloom filter. The fast clock domain contains the instruction
analyzer and process detector.
The purpose of each component is as follows:
Bus Interface AXI4-Lite slave bus interface for programming HSMON.
Event Counters Event counters for system calls, exceptions, system call
violations, SF FIFO dropped inputs, and 32-bit trace words.
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Trace Decoder Decodes TPIU frames, filters trace streams, and flags the
end byte of each instruction trace packet.
SF FIFO Transports 32-bit wide trace data in the slow clock domain to
8-bit data in the fast clock domain.
Instruction Analyzer Decodes address and context switch packets from
the instruction trace stream.
Process Detector Monitors address and context to identify packets corre-
sponding to the program of interest.
FS FIFO Transports 64-bit address and status bits from the fast clock do-
main to the slow clock domain.
Hash Queue Computes the hash of the incoming address and stores the
hashes of the prior N addresses. Also computes the XOR of all queued
hashes.
Bloom Filter Checks the XOR of the address hash queue against the Bloom
filter data uploaded through the programming interface.
4.1 Microarchitecture
The microarchitecture of selected components is described in this section.
This is not intended to describe the detailed operation of every component.
More detail is provided when the operation of a module is non-trivial.
4.1.1 Trace Decoder
The Trace Decoder is a pipeline that consists of five modules. Each module
accepts the output of the previous module in the pipeline. The pipeline
begins with the TPIU output data and ends with the ETM instruction trace
bytes, augmented by one bit per byte to indicate the bytes that finish a
packet. Figure 4.2 illustrates the trace decoder pipeline.
The sync remove module detects the 32-bit full-sync word that is peri-
odically output from the TPIU just prior to a 16 byte frame. After reset,







Figure 4.2: Trace decoder block diagram.
first full-sync word is detected, input is passed to deformatter with only the
full-sync words omitted.
The deformatter decodes the 16-byte frame format output by the TPIU.
The microarchitecture is a five-stage pipeline so that a full frame is buffered
in the module. Two output ports decode data for up to two trace IDs for
each input word. Both output ports pass data to the filter module.
The filter accepts up to four bytes on input port A and up to two bytes
on input port B per cycle with a distinct trace ID per port. A 7-bit trace
ID port indicates which trace ID will be passed through to the output, all
others are discarded. A single output port provides data to the compactor.
The compactor receives up to four bytes per cycle and outputs exactly
four bytes on each cycle that it produces output. A single four byte internal
register holds the input until four bytes can be output. Assuming a full four
byte input, data is moved to the length decoder with a one cycle delay.
The length decoder is the most sophisticated module in the trace decoder.
Figure 4.3 shows a diagram of the microarchitecture. It can be understood as
a sequence detector FSM for eight bit inputs. Instead of the usual arrange-
ment of next-state (NS) logic and storage element, the NS logic is duplicated
four times so that four input bytes are processed every cycle. The output of
the length decoder is four data bytes and four bits per cycle. Each of the
four additional bits indicates whether the corresponding byte is the end of
an instruction trace packet. The output is moved to the fast domain through
an asynchronous first-in, first-out queue (FIFO) connected to the instruction
analyzer.
4.1.2 Instruction Analyzer
The instruction analyzer decodes each address and context packet in the
instruction trace data stream. It retains and updates internal state informa-
tion needed for correct decoding of future packets. The output is the fully
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Figure 4.3: Length decoder microarchitecture.
decoded instruction address, exception type, and context ID. Three valid
signals indicate which of the three output types were decoded, even in the
case where the value did not change. One additional signal indicates that
the internal state was reset. The instruction analyzer data path is shown in
Figure 4.4. Combinational logic (not shown) controls the register load signals
and multiplexers.
The trace buffer captures sequential packet bytes from the incoming trace
data in an 18-byte wide register to allow parallel access to the complete
packet. It generates a valid signal to indicate to the control unit that a
complete packet is present on the wide output. Additionally, a sequential
output is provided with start byte and end byte signal. Note that the trace
decoder output only provides the end byte signal and the start byte signal is
generated internal to this module.
The packet detector and address detector modules that identify packet
headers and address formats. The packet detector identifies the nine packet
types that cause updates to the internal states from the sequential output of
the trace buffer. It outputs the packet type to the control unit. The address
detector identifies the address format used by the packet from the output
of the address multiplexer. The address multiplexer selects from the three
positions that an address packet can occur within the wide packet output of
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the trace buffer.
Timestamp decoder uses the wide output from the trace buffer to decode
updates to the timestamp register. The address decoder applies updates to
the address shift register chain based on the output of the address multi-
plexer. The context multiplexer selects from the seven positions where a
context update may occur within the wide packet output of the trace buffer.
From there, the context and virtual machine ID (VMID) decoder decodes the

















Figure 4.4: Instruction analyzer microarchitecture.
4.1.3 Hash Function
The hash function module implements the widely used MurmurHash3 func-
tion. Figure 4.5 shows the 12-stage arithmatic pipeline. It accepts a single
64-bit input and 32-bit seed value each cycle. It outputs a 32-bit hashed
value every cycle, with a 12-cycle latency from input to output.
This processing pipeline achieves much higher throughput than required.
It can hash a new input every cycle, but address packets only update at most
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every 8 cycles. An improved design would reduce the number of function










































Figure 4.5: MurmurHash3 function pipeline.
4.1.4 Hash Queue
The hash queue holds the last N hashed address values generated from the
trace stream. N is a fixed constant that is set before hardware synthesis.
The module’s output is the XOR of the previous N hashed address values.
A shift register tracks the previous N hashes and the output is computed
by the XOR of the oldest hash, newest hash, and the previous output hash.
Figure 4.6 shows the microarchitecture of the hash queue. Two hash queues
are used to generate a 64-bit hash input to the Bloom filter module.
4.1.5 Bloom Filter
The Bloom filter module computes a 65536 bit pattern containing one to four








Figure 4.6: Hash queue microarchitecture.
four 16-bit components. A 1-bit in the pattern is computed by the function
2k where k is the 16-bit component of the input hash. The Bloom filter
output is 1 when each 1-bit in the pattern is also a 1-bit in the Bloom filter
data. Otherwise, the output is 0.
Figure 4.7 shows the microarchitecture of the Bloom filter. The bus inter-
face to read/write the Bloom filter memory and the Bloom filter log memory
is not shown. The Bloom filter data is stored in a 2048 by 32 bit block RAM.





to find the address then computes 2(k mod 32) to compare with the data read
from memory. The Bloom filter data is loaded through the bus interface into
the memory array. A Bloom filter check begins when a new hash input is

























Figure 4.7: Bloom filter microarchitecture.
4.1.6 Event Counters
The final important component of the design is a set of event counters that
allow system software to measure the number of failed matches in the Bloom
Filter, number of system calls, exceptions, and trace words observed by
HSMON.
4.2 Programmer’s Interface
HSMON is software programmable through the AXI4-Lite memory-mapped
interface. Each register must be written with a 32-bit aligned data transfer.
Table A.1 shows the register set available to the programmer. All registers
are initialized to zero on circuit reset. A write access to any register aside
from the control register works in the conventional manner. A write access to
the control register toggles each bit in the register where the corresponding
location equals 1 in the write data. Bits that are 0 in the write data are not
toggled in the register. For example, writing the decimal value 1 sets the
ENABLE bit to 1 if it was previously 0, and 0 if it was previously 1. Table
A.2 describes each bit in the control register.
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Control bits enable optional features of HSMON and allow software trig-
gered reset of HSMON hardware. The RESET control bit clears registers
mapped above 128 when set. It also resets internal registers in the fast clock
domain, the hash queue, the Bloom filter, event counters, and LOCK bit. It
does not clear the Bloom filter internal memory. The LOCK control bit dis-
ables memory mapped access to registers numbered above 128. The LOCK
bit cannot be toggled off using a write to the bit. This ensures that once the
seed values are programmed they are no longer readable. The READONCE
control bit enables atomic counter reset during a memory-mapped read access
to the counter. This allows software to access counters periodically without
the need for synchronization between HSMON and the software. Mapping
between the hash queue units and the Bloom filter bit positions is controlled
by the bits TWOHASH and TWOBIT. The use of these bits to control
mapping between signatures and Bloom filter bit patterns is described later
in this section. The FERESET control bit clears registers internal to the
trace decoder. When the filter ID is changed the finite state machine in the
trace decoder could become stuck in an error state. Toggling FERESET will
restart the trace decoder. A single interrupt and a set of event counters pro-
vide feedback to the system software. The interrupt is set when a violation
occurs and clear when software clears the INTERRUPT bit in the the control
registers is cleared.
The ENABLE control bit restarts the process detector when the bit flips
from 0 to 1. The process detector watches the trace stream until the context
ID and start address are observed. Context ID and start address registers
should not change when the ENABLE bit is 1. The register outputs cross
clock domains without synchronization hardware, so a transient timing fault
could occur due to a flip-flop metastable state. Clearing the ENABLE bit
stops the process detector. No interrupts will occur and counters will not
increment.
There are five event counters. Each counter has a width of 32-bits and
an overflow flag readable from the status register. An overflow flag is set
when the counter increments from a non-zero value to zero and cleared by
software reset. The first three counters indicate events that occur in the
trace stream when the CPU core is in user mode and the CPU context ID
matches the HSMON context ID. Syscall count increments when a system
call is detected. Exception count increments when an exception is observed
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in user mode. An example is an access to an unmapped page in virtual
memory that is then mapped by the operating system exception handler.
Violation count increments when a signature violation is detected. The last
two events do not correspond to the process selected by the Process Detector.
Drop count increments when the SF FIFO is full. All count increments once
for each 32-bit word written to the SF FIFO. Both counters increment even
when ENABLE is 0.
In order to understand how to program the set of signatures, we must
first understand how a signature maps to bits in the Bloom filter and how
each bit position maps to a 32-bit word in the Bloom filter memory. Four
possible mappings are selected using the TWOHASH and TWOBIT control
bits. When TWOHASH is set to 1, a second 32-bit signature is generated
using the Seed2 register to set the hash seed. In the following discussion,
S1 is the first 32-bit signature generated using the value in the seed register
and S2 is generated using the seed2 register value. The two signatures are
mapped to a set of two or four 16-bit values. Each indicates a bit position
that must be 1 in the 65536-bit Bloom filter memory. Because the memory
is 32-bit word addressable through the memory mapped interface, we must
first compute the word address A and the bit position within the 32-bit word
B. We take “bit slices” of the 16-bit values Zi to compute
Ai = Zi [15 : 5]
Bi = Zi [4 : 0]
Bit position B must be set at address A in the Bloom filter memory for this
16-bit value.
The mapping of the two signatures S1 and S2 are as follows. If both control
bits, TWOHASH and TWOBIT, are 0 the mapping is
Z1 = S1 [7 : 0]
Z2 = S1 [15 : 8]
Z3 = S1 [23 : 16]
Z4 = S1 [31 : 24]
The upper 8 bits of each Zi are 0. This mapping effectively reduces the
Bloom filter from 65536-bits to 256-bits and should only be used for testing.
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If only TWOHASH is 1, the mapping is
Z1 = S1 [15 : 0]
Z2 = S1 [31 : 16]
Z3 = S2 [15 : 0]
Z4 = S2 [31 : 16]
If only TWOBIT is 1 only two 16-bit values are mapped as
Z1 = S1 [15 : 0]
Z2 = S1 [31 : 16]
If both TWOHASH and TWOBIT are 1 only two 16-bit values are mapped
as
Z1 = S1 [15 : 0]
Z2 = S2 [15 : 0]
We expect most programs will use the second mapping. The first is suitable
for testing and the third minimizes the run time of the static analysis process.
The data in the Bloom filter memory is programmed using a pair of
memory-mapped address and data registers. Bloom filter Address is a regis-
ter that contains an 11-bit pointer to a location in the Bloom filter memory.
Reading the Bloom filter data register returns the data from the memory
location addressed by the pointer. The pointer is incremented after the read.
Similarly, writing the Bloom filter data register writes to the location ad-
dressed by the pointer and the pointer is incremented after the write. Bloom
filter tested data accesses the memory where a log where bits that are tested
in the Bloom filter are recorded. The same address pointer is used for both
memories. Neither memory is automatically cleared by any control bit.
The Bloom filter log memory can be used to detect errors in static analysis.
For example, the log memory can be read from HSMON after the program
exits. Compare the log memory and the Bloom filter data at each bit position.
Any single bit value of 1 in the log memory that has a value of 0 at the same
position in the Bloom filter data is the due to an observed run-time signature
that was not determined through static analysis. Assuming that an attacker
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has not altered the control flow of the program, this indicates an error in
static analysis. The log memory can be saved and reloaded into the data
memory. It can be done repeatedly to build up a set of allowed signatures
by exercising the program under various inputs. This is not recommended
for normal use because it introduces the posibility of false negatives, or safe
control flow paths that are detected as violations.
4.3 Software Support and Tools
In order for HSMON to identify a running process, the OS kernel must be
configured at build time to set the process ID in the CPU context ID regis-
ter. No OS kernel code changes are required for HSMON to operate as an
event counter. Interrupt support requires a small driver so processes can be
automatically killed due to a violation.
Two software programs are provided for using HSMON on the Linux op-
erating system. Both are command line programs that are run from the
shell. The first, Tracer, configures and enables CoreSight components to
send trace data to the TPIU. The second, SMTool, controls the HSMON
hardware through the memory-mapped bus interface.
SMTool has three capabilities. First, it provides direct access to the read
and write memory-mapped registers in HSMON from the command shell.
Second, it saves and loads register values from binary files and can print
a summary output of the register states. Last, and most important, it can
program the registers and execute a user-specified command under the watch
of HSMON. Figure 4.8 shows the output of SMTool running a program that
invokes three system calls. In this mode, SMTool invokes the program listed
at the end of its command line options as a child process. It looks for a file
next to the program binary with the suffix “.hwdat” and reads the HSMON
configuration from that file. The file format is documented in Appendix
C. Prior to invoking the program, SMTool resets HSMON and programs
the registers and Bloom filter memory with the values from the filesystem.
Appendix B lists the sequence that is used. SMTool does not set the filter
ID and always clears the Bloom filter log. A Unix manual page documenting
the usage SMTool is in Appendix D.
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In this chapter we present our findings after implementation of HSMON in
the prototype system based on the Zynq Ultrascale+ device. We present and
discuss the results of implementation of the HSMON design in the FPGA
fabric with a focus on timing, area, and power.
The hardware design described in Chapter 4 was entered in SystemVerilog
and implemented with Xilinx Vivado 2017.2. It is synthesized for the Xilinx
series 8 architecture programmable logic in the XCZU2EG-SFVC784-1-E.
Figure 5.1: Vivado IP integrator block diagram.
Figure 5.1 shows the HSMON IP core in the Vivado IP Integrator tool
for our prototype system. The clock frequencies of each part of the system
are listed in Table 5.1. The clock ACPU is set to the maximum allowed
frequency for the Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+. The DDR memory clock is set
to the maximum frequency recommended by the circuit board designer.
Clock frequencies for the HSMON IP core were set conservatively to ease
timing closure. All FPGA resources were automatically placed and routed.
The critical paths through HSMON in the slow clock domain part of the
length decoder are shown in Figure 4.3. The next state (NS) modules consist
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Table 5.1: Clock frequencies in the prototype system.
Clock Freq. (MHz) Description
PL0 200 Programmable logic clock 0 is used by the
TPIU, AXI4 interconnect and the HSMON
slow clock domain.
PL1 400 Programmable logic clock 1 is used for the
HSMON fast clock domain.
ACPU 1200 Cortex-A53 CPU clock.
DDR 600 Processing system main memory clock.
only of combinational logic paths, so there is a long combinational path
between the outputs and inputs of the state registers. This is necessary to
allow the length decoder to decode four bytes per cycle with a variable length
encoding. We anticpated that this long path would meet timing at 250 MHz,
the maximum frequency of the TPIU that supplies data to HSMON, but
it did not. Static timing analysis was used to ensure reliable operation at
the chosen clock frequencies. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of timing
slack for circuit paths in the slow clock domain after the design was placed
and routed. Fewer than 5% of circuit paths have less than 2 nanoseconds
(ns) Worst Negative Slack (WNS). This suggests that manual placement or
manual Register Transfer Level (RTL) optimization would allow a faster clock
frequency in the slow domain.
Figure 5.2: Distribution of circuit paths by Worst Negative Slack (slow
domain).
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The critical paths in the fast domain are due to long combinational logic
paths in the instruction analyzer and the process detector. In the second case,
additional pipeline registers would reduce path length. A more extensive
redesign of the instruction analyzer may be needed to reduce logic depth.
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of timing slack for circuit paths in the fast
clock domain.
Figure 5.3: Distribution of circuit paths by Worst Negative Slack (fast
domain).
Figure 5.4 shows the placement of FPGA resources on the FPGA. Resource
utilization is shown in Table 5.2. Only a small fraction of FPGA resources
are used. Most resources are available for use by other IP cores integrated
into the same system. Arithmatic in the hash function unit is mapped to
fixed DSP48E2 [20] arithmatic pipelines offerred by the programmable logic
fabric. In many signal processing applications these units are valued highly
so a system integrator would want to replace the hash function of HSMON
with one that uses fewer arithmatic units or use time-domain multiplexing
to share a single hash function module between both hash queue modules.
Power analysis was performed on the IP core using Xilinx recommended
best practices [21]. Logic simulation of the post-synthesis netlist was used to
measure circuit circuit switching activity to increase the accuracy of dynamic
power estimation. Figure 5.5 shows the power summary for the IP core.
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Figure 5.4: FPGA circuit placement (HSMON logic units in red).
5.2 Performance
The Dhrystone benchmark was run on our prototype system to detect pro-
cessor core slowdown due to instruction tracing [22]. The benchmark pro-
gram ran 50 million iterations of its testing algorithm. We repeated it with
instruction tracing enabled and a second time with instruction tracing dis-
abled. When tracing was disabled, we measured 3866976 Dhrystone per
second. With tracing enabled, 3866976 Dhrystone per second were observed.
The benchmark was also invoked through SMTool. In this case, 3875969
Dhrystone per second were observed. It is not clear why there is a 0.2 per-
cent improvement in performance in this benchmark but it is consistent over
multiple repetitions.
We also evaluated performance overhead due to tracing using the SPEC
CPU 2006 benchmarks. Each benchmark was run five times with tracing
enabled, and tracing disabled. We compare the arithmatic mean run time
of each set of five to determine whether tracing has a measurable effect on
the programs. Figure 5.6 shows the percentage change in mean run time for
each benchmark. Small variations are due to the networked filesystem used
by the prototype system. HSMON has no effect on CPU performance.
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Table 5.2: FPGA resource utilization.
Resource Utilization Available Utilization %
LUT 3041 47232 6.44
LUTRAM 176 28800 0.61
FF 3326 94464 3.52
BRAM 17 150 11.33
DSP 36 240 15.00
IO 2 252 0.79
BUFG 2 196 1.02
Figure 5.5: IP core power summary.
5.3 Attack Detection
We wrote three programs that allow attacks to overwrite indirect control
flow targets by passing malformed command line arguments. Each program
bug represents a typical target of a code-reuse attack. Two programs are
vulnerable to stack buffer overflow, and one is vulnerable to heap buffer
overflow. The stack buffer overflow programs are attackable by return address
overwrite and function pointer overwrite. The heap program is attackable
by C++ virtual table overwrite. The source code for each program is listed
in Appendix E.
The first stack buffer overflow program (Listing E.1) allows an attack to
overwrite the return address of the “main” subroutine. The 8-byte array in
“act” is immediately below the frame pointer and the return address for the
“main” subroutine on the stack. A successful attack on this program consists
of passing a 24-byte string that “strcpy” writes over the frame pointer and
return address.






























































































































Figure 5.6: SPEC CPU 2006 change in run time.
overwrite a function pointer called by “main”. The function pointer is stored
immediately after the 8-byte array on the stack. A successful attack consists
of passing a 16-byte string that overwrites the function pointer address.
The heap buffer overflow program (Listing E.3) allows an attack to over-
write the C++ virtual table pointer. The normal memory allocator stores
the C++ object “obj” at a fixed offset from the array “buf” on the heap.
Command line arguments allow the attacker to write arbitrary data to mem-
ory at offsets from the start of the array, which is allowed by our attack
model.
For each program, we use the log feature of HSMON to learn the set of
allowed signatures by providing safe command line inputs that cause the
program to follow normal control flow paths. We then run each program
with normal inputs to verify that HSMON does not detect a violation, and
again with attack inputs to verify that HSMON counts violations that occur.
Each program was allowed to run to completion with the attack input, so
multiple violations can occur.
Table 5.3 shows the results of testing the three attackable programs. In
each case, HSMON detects multiple violations because the programs are
allowed to continue to completion.
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Table 5.3: Attack detection results.
Program Attack Nr. System Call Nr. Violation
Stack-Return (E.1) 3 0
Stack-Return (E.1) D 16 14
Stack-F. Pointer (E.2) 3 0
Stack-F. Pointer (E.2) D 9 8
Heap-V. Table (E.3) 4 0




In this work, we presented a hardware design for detecting when a pro-
gram makes unexpected indirect control flow transfers. We developed a new
method we call indirect control path signatures to describe allowable control
flow transfers in a program. A method was suggested for deriving signa-
tures from programs through static analysis. A hardware implementation
was designed, prototyped, and evaluated in a test system.
6.1 Future Work
Future work needs to develop a theoretical foundation to provide accurate
security guarantees using indirect control path signatures. We believe that
the combination techniques presented in this work present difficulties to an
attacker but the limits of this protection should be explored.
Improved software tools are needed. Sophisticated static analysis for sig-
nature generation from binary programs improves the usefulness of HSMON.
The hardware IP core can monitor any software running on our prototype
platform but it is of limited usefulness without a way to extract signatures
from large programs. Software support is needed to support dynamic li-
braries, just-in-time compiled code, and run-time dynamic linking (dlopen).
Operating system drivers need to be developed to receive interrupts, kill
tasks, and support context switching between multiple monitored programs.
In Section 5.1 we saw that the clock frequencies of the hardware design can
be improved. The slow clock domain should operate at the maximum fre-
quency of the TPIU (250 MHz) to maximize the available bandwidth between
the ARM Trace Bus and the Programmable Logic. Future work supporting
multiple cores will need higher performance across this interface. Increased
frequency in the fast clock domain will allow a smaller clock-crossing FIFO
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for bringing trace data into the fast domain.
FPGA resource utilization, also called area, can be optimized by moving
the Length Decoder from the slow clock domain to the fast clock domain.
As previously discussed, the critical timing path in the slow clock domain is
in this module so this change would also increase the maximum frequency.
Hash Function units could support multiplexed input and output to reduce
the number of DSP units required. Alternate hashing functions that are more
optimal for hardware area is another aspect to explore.
In this work there was no design effort to reduce power consumption.
Power efficiency is the most important design consideration for 64-bit ARM
application processors that are similar those in our prototype platform. FPGA
programmable logic has relatively high static power consumption compared
to ASIC CMOS circuits but improved logic design can narrow the gap. Power
hungry block RAM for the FIFOs and Bloom filter can be powered off when
they are not used. Due to high static power consumption, we expect that
any area reduction of the IP core will also reduce power consumption.
6.2 Final Remarks
Many improvements can be made to the design presented here. We believe
that the use of hardware support for instruction tracing offers new capabilities
to the security research community. We hope to see more support added to
next-generation SoC and CPU designs so that more researchers will explore
the use of tracing to enable secure systems.
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Programmable registers and register fields are described in Tables A.1–A.3.
For more information about programming HSMON refer to Section 4.2.
Table A.1: Memory-mapped registers.
Offset R/W Name Description
0 RW Control Bit flags to control opera-
tion of HSMON.
4 R Status Status bit flags to indicate
event counter overflow.
68 R Syscall Count Number of system calls
observed since reset.
72 R Exception Count Number of exceptions ob-
served since reset.
76 R Violation Count Number of system calls
that failed to match in the
Bloom filter.
80 R Drop Count Number of 32-bit words
dropped at the SF FIFO
due to high trace data vol-
ume.
84 R All Count Number of 32-bit words
received from the TPIU.
128 RW Context ID Context ID of the process
to monitor. Normally the
same as the process ID in
Linux.
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Table A.1: Memory-mapped registers (cont.).
Offset R/W Name Description
136 RW Start Address Low Least significant 32-bit
component of the 64-bit
program start address.
140 RW Start Address High Most significant 32-bit
component of the start
address.
144 RW Seed Seed value for the Mur-
murHash3 hash algorithm.
148 RW Seed 2 Seed value for the Mur-
murHash3 hash algoritm
in the second function
unit.
512 RW Bloom Filter Address The next read or write to
the Bloom filter data reg-
ister will access this loca-
tion in the Bloom filter
data memory.
516 RW Bloom Filter Data A read or write to this reg-
ister accesses the Bloom
filter memory at the ad-
dress pointed to by the
Bloom filter address reg-
ister. The address reg-
ister is incremented after
the access.
520 RW Bloom Filter Tested Data A read or write to this reg-
ister accesses the Bloom
filter tested memory at the
address pointed to by the
Bloom filter address reg-
ister. The address reg-
ister is incremented after
the access.
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Table A.2: Control register bit fields.
Bit Name Description
0 ENABLE HSMON enable flag. A transition from 0 to 1 on
this bit enables the process detector.
1 RESET Resets all internal HSMON state except for the trace
decoder. Clears all memory mapped registers with
an offset greater or equal to 128.
2 LOCK Setting this bit disables read and write of memory
mapped registers with an offset greater or equal to
128. Cannot be toggled to 0. This bit is cleared by
toggling RESET.
3 READONCE Settings this bit forces event counters to atomati-
cally cleared to 0 during a read from the memory-
mapped bus interface.
4 TWOHASH Setting this bit enables the second hash function
unit that uses seed 2.
5 TWOBIT Setting this bit remaps the hash output to Bloom
filter mapping so that at most two bits will be used
per signature.
30 FERESET Resets internal state of the trace decoder.
31 INTERRUPT Interrupt service flag.
Table A.3: Status register bit fields.
Bit Name Description
5 SYSCALLOF Syscall counter overflow flag.
6 EXCEPTOF Exception counter overflow flag.
7 VIOLATEOF Violation counter overflow flag.
8 DROPOF Drop counter overflow flag.




The recommended programming sequence for HSMON is:
1. Clear the ENABLE bit in the control register.
2. Set the RESET bit in the control register.
3. If it is necessary to change the filter ID register, use the following
sequence:
(a) Set the FERESET bit in the control register.
(b) Write the filter ID register.
(c) Clear the FERESET bit.
4. Set the seed, context ID, and start address registers.
5. Set the TWOHASH and TWOBIT control registers according to the
Bloom filter size and hash policy.
6. Initialize the Bloom filter address register to 0.
7. Write a the sequence of 2048 Bloom filter 32-bit vectors to the Bloom
filter data register. If TWOHASH is 0, only 8 vectors need to be
written.
8. Set the Bloom filter address register to 0.
9. If the Bloom filter log will be used, write zero to the Bloom filter tested
data register 2048 times. If TWOHASH is 0, it only need written 8
times.
10. Set the Bloom filter address register.
11. Set the ENABLE bit in the control register.
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APPENDIX C
SMTOOL HWDAT FILE FORMAT
HWDAT is the file format used by SMTool to save and load memory-mapped
registers from the filesystem. There are two formats, selected by the 4th bit
in the file. In Table C.1 the column TH0 Off lists the byte offset for a field
when the 4th bit is 0, and the column TH1 Off lists the byte offset for the
field when the 4th bit is 1.
Table C.1: HWDAT file format.
Field TH0 Off TH1 Off Description
Control Register 0 0 Control register value. Only
bits 4 and 5 are loaded.
Seed 4 4 Seed register value.
Seed2 8 Seed 2 register value.
Start Address Low 8 12 Start address low register
value.
Start Address High 12 16 Start address high register
value.
BFilter 0 16 20 Bloom filter memory address 0
value.
BFilter 1 20 24 Bloom filter memory address 1
value.
BFilter 2 24 28 Bloom filter memory address 2
value.
...




SMTOOL UNIX MANUAL PAGE
NAME
smtool - control the signature monitor IP core
SYNOPSIS
smtool [-rwsSTmg ] [-a ADDR] [-x cmd...]
DESCRIPTION
cstool accesses the memory-mapped interface of the signature monitor IP core through
/dev/mem.
OPTIONS
-r Read from the register at ADDR.
-w Write DATA to the register at ADDR.
-a ADDR
Sets the 32-bit word address to read or write in hexadecimal.
-d DATA
Sets the data to read or write in hexadecimal.
-s Print a summary of register settings.
-S Print a summary of register settings with memory dump of the Bloom Filter
memory.
-T Also print a memory dump of the Bloom Filter log.  Must be used with -s or -S.
-x cmd...
Execute cmd as a child process after the signature monitor hardware is config-
ured. Requires a cmd.hwdat file.
-g Save a copy of the register and memory values to the file cmd.hwdat.out. Must
be used with -x cmd.
-m Merge the Bloom Filter log with the Bloom Filter memory before saving. Must
be used with -x cmd and -g.
BUGS





EXPLOIT EXAMPLE PROGRAM CODE
Listing E.1: Stack buffer overflow program for return address overwrite.
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t d l i b . h>
void dead ( )
{
system ( ”echo h i ” ) ;
}
void act (char ∗ s t r )
{
char name [ 8 ] = {0} ;
s t r cpy (name , s t r ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” h e l l o %s \n” , name ) ;
}
int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv , char ∗∗ env )
{
i f ( argc < 2)
return 1 ;




Listing E.2: Stack buffer overflow program for function pointer overwrite.
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t d l i b . h>
typedef int (∗ f p t r ) ( char ∗ ) ;
int deadcode (char ∗name)
{
system (name ) ;
}
int pp a (char ∗name)
{
p r i n t f ( ” h e l l o %s \n” , name ) ;
}
int pp b (char ∗name)
{
p r i n t f ( ”goodbye %s \n” , name ) ;
}
stat ic f p t r f n l i s t [ 2 ] = {pp a , pp b } ;
int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv , char ∗∗ env )
{
char name [ 8 ] = {0} ;
f p t r fn ;
i f ( argc < 2)
return 1 ;
fn = f n l i s t [ argc −2] ;
s t r cpy (name , argv [ 1 ] ) ;




Listing E.3: Heap buffer overflow program for virtual table overwrite.
#include <c s td io>
#include <c s t r i ng>




virtual void f ( ) = 0 ;
void p ( ) { p r i n t f ( ”%c : : f ( )\n” , ch ) ; }
} ;
class A : public Base {
public :
virtual void f ( ) { ch = ’A ’ ; }
} ;
class B : public Base {
public :
virtual void f ( ) { ch = ’B ’ ; }
} ;
class C : public Base {
public :
virtual void f ( ) ;
} ;
void C : : f ( ) { ch = ’C ’ ; }
int (∗ f p t r ) ( const char∗) = system ;
int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv , char ∗∗ env )
{
int i ;
Base ∗ obj ;
i f ( argc < 4)
return 1 ;
p r i n t f ( ”\n” ) ;
unsigned long ∗buf = new unsigned long [ 1 6 ] ;
i f ( ! a t o i ( argv [ 1 ] ) ) {
obj = new A( ) ;
} else {
obj = new B( ) ;
}
buf [ a t o i ( argv [ 2 ] ) ] = s t r t o u l ( argv [ 3 ] , NULL, 1 6 ) ;
obj−>f ( ) ;
obj−>p ( ) ;
delete obj ;
delete buf ;
return 0 ;
}
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